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Visualize This! Meaningful Metrics for Managing Risk

SESSION ID: GRC-F02

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Agenda

- What do you mean by meaningful metrics?
 - Build your own metric audience participation!
- Metrics Categorization
- Leveraging Frameworks and Models
- What decisions do your metrics focus on supporting? Examples.
- Every organization has loss events. What loss metrics do you capture and how do you leverage them?
- Painting a picture with meaningful metrics



Vocabulary

- Measurement vs. Metric what's the difference?
 - I had 2 eggs for breakfast this morning
 - It's 46 degrees in Sterling, VA
 - This workshop is 105 minutes long
 - A measurement is the value of a specific characteristic of a given entity
 - A metric is the aggregation of one or more measurements to create a piece of business intelligence.
 - What is the question the metric answers?
 - What is the decision the metric supports?
 - What is the environmental context?




Real Life Metrics

- What metrics are you using to <u>answer questions</u> and <u>make</u> <u>decisions</u> about software security?
 - What question, what decision
 - Who's asking, who's answering
 - What's the goal
 - What environmental context




Build Your Own Metric







• Risk Landscape Visibility –helps us understand how well informed (or not) our risk decisions are. The values represent data and estimates regarding four elements (asset population, threat conditions, value/liability at risk, and control conditions). This helps us to focus on specific areas of poor visibility, thus improving our ability to make well-informed risk decisions.





 Root Cause Analysis — which helps us understand why undesirable conditions exist (e.g., non-compliance with policy). This enables us to focus on our efforts to systemically improve.








Loss Exposure Comparison – allows us to compare a current level of loss exposure against a proposed future level assuming the application of new controls. Forms the benefit component of a cost-benefit analysis






Risk Scenario Prioritization – allows us to compare the level of loss exposure from multiple scenarios, which improves our ability to prioritize effectively





Large Scale Scenario Prioritization – allows us to compare the level of loss exposure from many scenarios, which improves our ability to prioritize effectively





Definition of "Risk"?

 The probability of a loss event occurring and the probable magnitude of loss that results




Take Aways

- Developing metrics and applying models that are meaningful in the context of your organization
- Breaking down metrics by category
- Choosing frameworks and models
- Delivering the right metrics for your audience, so they can make informed decisions about business risk management
- Applying useful examples to help you quantify risk at your organization and present it concisely to your management

Good metrics and practices → Good Governance → Risk Reduction



Appendix





My Fitness Pal

- I ask questions and make decisions about my health every day
 - What should I eat for breakfast?
 - How much? How often?
 - What kind of exercise should I do?
 - For what length of time? How often?
- I can <u>change my behavior</u> by setting goals and measuring progress
 - SMART goals
 - Specific, measurable, actionable, reasonable, time-based



Software Security Metrics

BUSINESS QUESTION	METRIC – BUSINESS INTEL	COMMENTS		
What's the impact on production defects of a 10% increase in software security spending for static analysis?	Trend in SSI cost vs. Trend in production software security defects	Comparing the two trendlines is more useful than looking at either in isolation		
Which security technology stacks and components harbor the greatest amount of defects?	Discoveries of vulnerability x / App component type	Understanding the prevalence of a vuln for a specific app component type is more useful than counting discovery instances without the environmental context		
How long does it take the organization to successfully respond to process variances?	Average days to remediate variance / Variance type	Understanding the time it takes to address variances by variance type is more useful than without the environmental context		
How much extra work is caused by the need to triage results (remove false positives, etc) from testing tools?	Static analysis false positives / Tool / Defect type / Tech stack / Analysis rule	Any of the counts alone are less useful than when viewed together for more complete business context		
What is the impact of training on software security defects found in various types of testing?	Web app Java code from developers with 8 hours of instruction has 20% fewer defects found by static analysis than code from untrained developers	Look at desired outcomes of training rather than		



A Software Security Framework

The Software Security Framework (SSF)									
Governance	Intelligence	SSDL Touchpoints	Deployment						
Strategy and Metrics	Attack Models	Architecture Analysis	Penetration Testing						
Compliance and Policy	Security Features and Design	Code Review	Software Environment						
Training	Standards and Requirements	Security Testing	Configuration Management and Vulnerability Manage- ment						

Four domains

Twelve practices


See informIT article on BSIMM website http://bsimm.com



BSIMM Scorecard

Governance		Intelligen	ice	SSDL Tou	chpoints	Deployment	
Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed
[SM1.1]	44	[AM1.1]	21	[AA1.1]	56	[PT1.1]	62
[SM1.2]	34	[AM1.2]	43	[AA1.2]	35	[PT1.2]	51
[SM1.3]	34	[AM1.3]	30	[AA1.3]	24	[PT1.3]	43
[SM1.4]	57	[AM1.4]	12	[AA1.4]	42	[PT2.2]	24
[SM1.6]	36	[AM1.5]	42	[AA2.1]	10	[PT2.3]	27
[SM2.1]	26	[AM1.6]	16	[AA2.2]	8	[PT3.1]	13
[SM2.2]	31	[AM2.1]	7	[AA2.3]	20	[PT3.2]	8
[SM2.3]	27	[AM2.2]	11	[AA3.1]	11		
[SM2.5]	20	[AM3.1]	4	[AA3.2]	4		
[SM3.1]	16	[AM3.2]	6				
[SM3.2]	6						
[CP1.1]	43	[SFD1.1]	54	[CR1.1]	24	[SE1.1]	34
[CP1.2]	52	[SFD1.2]	53	[CR1.2]	34	[SE1.2]	61
[CP1.3]	45	[SFD2.1]	26	[CR1.4]	50	[SE2.2]	31
[CP2.1]	24	[SFD2.2]	29	[CR1.5]	23	[SE2.4]	25
[CP2.2]	28	[SFD2.3]	9	[CR1.6]	25	[SE3.2]	10
[CP2.3]	29	[SFD3.1]	13	[CR2.2]	10	[SE3.3]	9
[CP2.4]	25	[SFD3.2]	9	[CR2.5]	15		
[CP2.5]	35			[CR3.1]	18		
[CP3.1]	14			[CR3.2]	4		
[CP3.2]	11			[CR3.3]	6		
[CP3.3]	8			[CR3.4]	1		


Earth (67)





BSIMM as a Measuring Stick

- Compare a firm with peers using the high water mark view
- Compare business units
- Chart an SSI over time





BSIMM Scorecard with FAKE Firm Data

Governar	100		Intellige	nco		CEDI TO	uchnointe	-	Deployme	nt.	
BSIMM-V		BSIMM-V			SSDL Touchpoints BSIMM-V			BSIMM-V			
Activity	Firms	FIRM	Activity	Firms	FIRM	Activity	Firms	FIRM	Activity	Firms	FIRM
[SM1.1]	44	1	[AM1.1]	21	1	[AA1.1]	56	1	[PT1.1]	62	1
[SM1.2]	34		[AM1.2]	43		[AA1.2]	35	1	[PT1.2]	51	1
[SM1.3]	34	1	[AM1.3]	30		[AA1.3]	24	1	[PT1.3]	43	250
[SM1.4]	<i>57</i>	1	[AM1.4]	12	1	[AA1.4]	42		[PT2.2]	24	1
[SM1.6]	36		[AM1.5]	42	1	[AA2.1]	10		[PT2.3]	27	
[SM2.1]	26		[AM1.6]	16		[AA2.2]	8	1	[PT3.1]	13	1
[SM2.2]	31		[AM2.1]	7		[AA2.3]	20		[PT3.2]	8	
[SM2.3]	27		[AM2.2]	11	1	[AA3.1]	11		3		
[SM2.5]	20		[AM3.1]	4		[AA3.2]	4		9		
[SM3.1]	16		[AM3.2]	6							
[SM3.2]	6										
[CP1.1]	42	1	[SFD1.1]	54		[CR1.1]	24		[SE1.1]	34	
[CP1.2]	52		[SFD1.2]	53	1	[CR1.2]	34	1	[SE1.2]	61	1
[CP1.3]	45	1	[SFD2.1]	26		[CR1.4]	50	1	[SE2.2]	31	1
[CP2.1]	24		[SFD2.2]	29		[CR1.5]	23		[SE2.4]	25	
[CP2.2]	28		[SFD3.1]	9		[CR1.6]	25	1	[SE3.2]	10	
[CP2.3]	28		[SFD3.2]	13		[CR2.2]	10		[SE3.3]	9	
[CP2.4]	25		[SFD3.3]	9		[CR2.5]	15		5		
[CP2.5]	35	1	3			[CR2.6]	18	2000			
[CP3.1]	14		8			[CR3.2]	4	1	3		
[CP3.2]	11		3			[CR3.3]	6				
[CP3.3]	8		9			[CR3.4]	1		2		
[T1.1]	50	1	[SR1.1]	48	1	[ST1.1]	51	1	[CMVM1.1]	59	1
[T1.5]	29		[SR1.2]	43		[ST1.3]	55	1	[CMVM1.2]		
[T1.6]	23	1	[SR1.3]	45	1	[ST2.1]	27	1	[CMVM2.1]		1
[T1.7]	33		[SR1.4]	27	1	[ST2.4]	13		[CMVM2.2]		
[T2.5]	9		[SR2.2]	23		[ST3.1]	11		[CMVM2.3]		
[T2.6]	13	1	[SR2.3]	19		[ST3.2]	8		[CMVM3.1]		
[T2.7]	9		[SR2.4]	19		[ST3.3]	6		[CMVM3.2]	6	
[T3.1]	4		[SR2.5]	22	1	[ST3.4]	5	Sec. 1999	[CMVM3.3]	2	
[T3.2]	4		[SR3.1]	8		[ST3.5]	7		3		
[T3.3]	8		[SR3.2]	12							
[T3.4]	9										
[T3.5]	5										

Top 12 activities

purple = good?

red = bad?

"Blue shift" practices to emphasize

Activity 111 BSIMM-V activities, shown in 4 domains and 12 practices BSIMM Firms count of firms (out of 67) observed performing each activity

the most common activity within a practice

a common activity not observed in this assessment a common activity observed in this assessment

a practice where firm's high-water mark score is below the BSIMM-V average




Each of us is a Special Snowflake (NOT)



ISV (25) results are similar to financial services (26)



BSIMM Longitudinal: Improvement over Time



21 firms measured twice (an average of 24 months apart)

Show how firms improve


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BSIMM by the Numbers

	BSIMM1	BSIMM2	вѕіммз	BSIMM4	BSIMM-V
Firms	9	30	42	51	67
Measurements	9	49	81	95	161
2 nd Measurements	0	0	11	13	21
3 rd Measurements	0	0	0	1	4
SSG Members	370	635	786	974	976
Satellite Members	710	1150	1750	2039	1954
Developers	67,950	141,175	185,316	218,286	272,358
Applications	3970	28,243	41,157	58,739	69,039
Avg SSG Age	5.32	4.49	4.32	4.13	4.28
SSG Avg of Avgs	1.13 / 100	1.02 / 100	1.99 / 100	1.95 / 100	1.4 / 100
Financials	4	12	17	19	26
ISVs	4	7	15	19	25
High Tech	2	7	10	13	14



The Predictive Security Model





Top Ten Risks

