

# Next Level Cheating and Leveling Up Mitigations

**Nicolas Guigo**

**Joel St. John**



# Agenda

- A brief history of cheating in video games
- Current state of the arms race (cheating vs anti-cheat)
- The future of cheating
- Attacking anti-cheat software
- Solutions and conclusions



# The Money Aspect

---

- Multi-billion dollar industry
- Subscription models
- Streaming/Sponsorship
- Virtual grey market



# What is Cheating?

---

- Unfair advantage
  - Abusing game logic
    - Multi-accounts
    - Botting/Scripting
    - Manipulating extraneous client-side data
  - Exploiting client / server code bugs
    - Abusing bugs/glitches
    - Attacking other players or the game server



# A History of Cheating

---

- Early computer games
- Early multiplayer games
- Modern multiplayer games
- Examples!



# Common Cheating Vectors

---

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting





# Common Cheating Vectors

---

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting
- Player/item finding hacks





Charcoal Tabs

Baseball Bat

Rotten Orange

7.62mm Rounds Wrench

Map of St. Stanislaus  
Wrench

7.62mm 20 Rounds

Rotten Banana

Green Pen

Zluta Kolaoka Soda

Blue Pen

Black Wood Chip

T-Shirt White

First Aid Kit

Dallas mask

21

19

33

35

53  
52

10

20  
19

17

35  
18

Zombie  
27

27

2

5



# Common Cheating Vectors

---

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting
- Player/item finding hacks
- Wall hacks/x-ray mods





Health: 10 hearts (100%)  
Hunger: 10 hearts (100%)  
Experience: 23  
Hotbar: 10 slots (1st slot highlighted)

Sword	Bow	Pickaxe	Shovel	11	2	34	4	6
-------	-----	---------	--------	----	---	----	---	---

x: 138  
y: 68  
z: 267



# The Rise of Anti-Cheat

- Warden (~2004)
  - World of Warcraft
  - Starcraft 2
- Valve Anti-Cheat (VAC, 2002)
  - Counter-Strike
  - Team Fortress 2
- BattlEye (2004)
  - Arma 2/3
  - Day-Z
- User-land
- Reactive
- Only a mitigation



# The Current State of Cheating in Games

- DLL injection (internal cheating)
  - Loader
  - DLL implementing cheat logic
    - Hook Direct3D calls
    - Read/Write memory
- Network packet manipulation
  - Modify packets in-transit
  - Repeat packets
  - Introduce artificial lag
- External cheating
  - ReadProcessMemory / WriteProcessMemory
  - Transparent window



# Current State of Anti-Cheat


- In process
  - Signature checks
  - Game specific checks
  - Hook detection
    - Pointer chain checks
  - Call stacks periodic checks
  - Debug related detections
- Out of process
  - Signature based detection
  - Pattern searching in all processes address space
- Various
  - Scanning for game process handles
  - Scanning files for signatures (offline)
    - Send suspected programs to server for analysis
  - Check DNS history for cheat update servers
  - Etc.



# The Future of Cheating


- Architecture
  - Rootkit-like functionality to hide activity
  - Kernel driver
    - Makes the UM portion a protected process (DRM)
    - Maps pages from game memory into the cheat process
    - Install a filter device on the FS stack (TBD)
  - User mode executable
    - Keeps track of game/cheat mappings
    - Implements the cheat logic






User

Kernel




Hardware



RAM



0xFDF



# Dual mapping snippet

```

status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((PVOID)ncmmap->process, (PEPROCESS*)&epb);
if(NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
    ncmd1 = NcAllocateMDL((PVOID)ncmmap->baseAddress, ncmmap->len);
    if(ncmd1) {
        KeStackAttachProcess(epb, &kapcstate);
        MmInitializeMdl(&ncmd1->mdl, (PVOID)ncmmap->baseAddress, (SIZE_T)ncmmap->len);
        _try {
            MmProbeAndLockPages(&ncmd1->mdl, UserMode, IoWriteAccess);
        }
        _except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
            getout=TRUE;
        }
        KeUnstackDetachProcess(&kapcstate);
        if(!getout) {
            _try {
                userVa = (DWORD64)MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache(&ncmd1->mdl, UserMode, MmCached, NULL, FALSE, NormalPagePriority);
            }
            _except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
                userVa = 0;
            }
            if(userVa) {
                ncmd1->mdl.StartVa=(PVOID)userVa;
            }
            MmUnlockPages(&ncmd1->mdl);
        } // if !getout
    } else {
        ExFreePoolWithTag(ncmd1, NCDRIVER_TAG);
    }
} // if ncmd1
ObDereferenceObject((PVOID)epb);
} // if process

```

# Dual-mapping demo

---



# Pros / Cons

---

- Strengths
  - Generic
  - Virtually undetectable from user-mode
  - Straightforward conversion from publicly available cheat sources
  - Good performance
- Weaknesses
  - Can be challenged by KM anti-cheat
  - Run in debug mode or use signed driver



# Attacking Anti-Cheat Software

- Anti-cheat libraries create additional attack surface
  - On client
  - On server
- This attack surface is common to multiple games
- What happens if there is a flaw?



# BattlEye


- General architecture
  - On the client
    - DLL in game process
    - System service
  - On the server
    - DLL in game server process
  - Master server
- Hooks game recv() call



# BE Packet structure

---


- Packet structure



- 2 bytes signature
- Hash
- Len /code
- data



# Sign extension



# Integer overflow -> heap overwrite

```
mov     ecx, [ebp+4]
sub     ecx, 7
push   ecx           ; size_t
lea     edx, [ebx+3]
push   edx           ; void *
add     eax, 7
push   eax           ; void *
call   _memcpy_0
xor     eax, eax
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+8], eax
mov     [ebp+0Ch], eax
mov     [ebp+14h], eax
mov     [ebp+18h], eax
cmp     dword_10035890[esi], eax
jz     short loc_10005A1C
```

```
lea     eax, [edi+4]
push   eax           ; size_t
mov     [ebp+4], eax
call   ??2@YAPAXIQZ ; operator new(uint)
add     esp, 4
test   eax, eax
mov     [ebp+0], eax
jz     short loc_10005A2D
```


# Exploitability

---

- Denial of Service is trivial
- Remote code execution possible
  - Overwriting heap data
  - Attacker-controlled data
- Very difficult
  - Separate heap limits attack surface
    - Tool: <https://github.com/iSECPartners/vtfinder>
  - Race condition
    - Code execution must be achieved before thread crashes
    - Must then prevent crash from happening



# BattlEye console timing attack



- Length check
- String comparison



# BattlEye timing attack demo

---



# Disclosure timeline

---

- Both vulnerabilities
  - Verified 08/2014
  - Disclosed to vendor 08/2014
  - Bugs
    - Memory corruption | fixed
    - Login vulnerability | unpatched (to date)



# The Future of Anti-Cheat

---

- Mitigations
  - Move the arms race to the kernel
  - Human factor
- Solutions
  - Full streaming of games
  - Closed platform



# Conclusion

---

- Anti-cheat is a mitigation at best
- Anti-cheat creates additional attack surface
- Current anti-cheat can be completely bypassed
- Fundamental design changes are needed



# Questions

- Thank you
  - Rachel Engel & Jason Bubolz
  - Rohit Shambhuni (iSEC 2014 Intern, Arizona State)
  - Taylor Trabun (iSEC 2014 Intern, University of Idaho)
  - Too many iSECers to list



Interns are people too!



# References

- Boneh, D. and Brumley, D (2003). Remote timing attacks are practical. 12<sup>th</sup> Usenix Security Symposium.  
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/ssl-timing.pdf>
- Vtfinder. <https://github.com/iSECPartners/vtfinder>





**UK Offices**

Manchester - Head Office  
Cheltenham  
Edinburgh  
Leatherhead  
London  
Thame



**North American Offices**

San Francisco  
Atlanta  
New York  
Seattle



**Australian Offices**

Sydney

**European Offices**

Amsterdam - Netherlands  
Munich – Germany  
Zurich - Switzerland