

# RSA CONFERENCE 2014

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## iOS Security

### The Never-Ending Story of Malicious Profiles

SESSION ID: BR-R02

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# About the Presenters

## Yair Amit

- ◆ CTO & co-founder of Skycure
- ◆ Web, network and mobile researcher
- ◆ Inventor of 15 patents
- ◆ Former manager of the Application Security & Research group at IBM

## Adi Sharabani

- ◆ CEO & co-founder of Skycure
- ◆ Watchfire's research group [Acquired by IBM]
- ◆ Lead the security of IBM software
- ◆ Fellow at Yuval Neeman's workshop
- ◆ Teacher at Ohel Shem high-school



# Agenda

- ◆ iOS security model
- ◆ Malicious profiles
- ◆ iOS 7.1 security fix
- ◆ Impact on MDMs
- ◆ Afterthoughts

# Starting With the Obvious

- ◆ Android malware threat growth:



Source: Trend Micro 2012 Mobile Threat and Security Roundup




# iOS Security Model

## App Characteristics

- One Store
- Heavy Screening
- App Sandboxing

## Profile Characteristics

- No Store
- No Screening
- No Sandboxing



# Configuration Profiles – Where Do We Find Them?

- ◆ Mobile Device Management (MDM)
- ◆ Cellular carriers
  - ◆ Usually used for APN settings
- ◆ Mobile applications
- ◆ Service providers



# Malicious Profiles



Hacker gains access to your mail, business apps, cloud services, bank accounts and more, **even if traffic is encrypted**

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**Time for a demo**  
(so take out your iOS device)






# Malicious Profiles – Where Do We Find Them?

- ◆ Malicious “service providers” (apps/services/etc.)
- ◆ Malicious Wi-Fi networks
- ◆ Vulnerable services

# Am I Safe?


- ◆ Profile listing could indicate suspicious profiles
- ◆ Cat-and-mouse game: attackers can name their profile to look benign





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**So let's remove the  
attack**

# The Invisible Profile

- ◆ iOS vulnerability allowing a profile to hide itself.
- ◆ Identified by Assaf Hefetz, researcher and developer, Skycure
- ◆ So what happened:
  - ◆ Victim was lured into installing a special crafted profile
  - ◆ Due to iOS bug, profile is not listed in the Profiles pane
  - ◆ Malicious profile is active and yet hidden
- ◆ Additional technical details pending on iOS 7.1 release





## **Malicious Profiles and MDMs**


# Mobile Device Management

## ◆ Enrollment:

1. A configuration profile is sent to the device
2. User installs the MDM profile
3. Device connects to MDM Server to enroll

## ◆ Commands:


4. Server sends an APNS command
5. Device connects directly to the server over HTTPS (Server sends commands or requests information)





# Mobile Device Management


- ◆ MDM profile could potentially act as a powerful “malicious profile”.
- ◆ However:
  - ◆ Alarming installation message
  - ◆ Barriers to become an MDM
  - ◆ Only one MDM is allowed on device



# MDM Security Issues

- ◆ David Schuetz presented a great research on MDM security

SSL communication between client and MDM server lacks certificate-pinning



- ◆ Problem increases when malicious profiles are used to exploit MDM protocol shortcomings



# MDM Piggybacking

- ◆ Attack scenario:
  - ◆ IT/user enrolls an iOS device to a legitimate MDM service
  - ◆ Victim installs a malicious profile
  - ◆ Attacker waits ...
  - ◆ MDM server sends an APNS command  
(attacker has no control over this part)
  - ◆ iOS device asks the MDM server for commands
    - ◆ (attacker does have control over this)
  - ◆ Attacker impersonates the MDM server

# Possible Attacks – Removal of MDM

- ◆ A simple 401 HTTP response leads to the removal of the MDM (and associated settings or apps) from the device

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-Control: must-revalidate,no-cache,no-store
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Encoding: gzip
```



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**Full Demo Flow**

# Impact

- ◆ Things an attacker can do:
  - ◆ Remove the MDM profile (along with associated apps, configuration and data)
  - ◆ Send MDM query commands (e.g., list apps, profiles, certificates)
  - ◆ Perform an action (lock, remote wipe)
  - ◆ Configure additional stuff (Wi-Fi/APN proxy settings, install apps)



# Some Challenges

- ◆ Challenge: Client-side certificate validation
  - ◆ Not all MDMs enforce them
  - ◆ Mdm-Signature HTTP header
- ◆ Challenge: Reliance on APNS calls
  - ◆ Chaining consequent commands
- ◆ Challenge: MDM can query the profile list
  - ◆ The “invisible profile” is also hidden from the MDM



# Current Status

- ◆ We reported to Apple the issue at the end of September, 2013
- ◆ Apple fixed the issue in 7.1 code (GA should be released soon)
- ◆ We are not aware of live exploitation of the issue
- ◆ We acknowledge Apple's security team for dedication to the security of their products



# Recommendations

- ◆ **End users:**

- ◆ Maintain an up to date OS
- ◆ Check your iOS for suspicious profiles
- ◆ If you don't have profiles, make sure you don't have the profile menu

- ◆ **Organizations:**

- ◆ Enforce OS updates
- ◆ Implement network based solutions for your mobile devices

- ◆ **MDM Vendors:**

- ◆ Verify client side certificates
- ◆ Work with Apple on the MDM protocol issues

# Thank you!

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