

# RSA CONFERENCE 2014

FEBRUARY 24 – 28 | MOSCONE CENTER | SAN FRANCISCO

Share.  
Learn.  
Secure.

Capitalizing on  
Collective Intelligence

## Fun with Proxmark3

SESSION ID: BR-R04A

Daniel Ayoub

Product Manager – IPS  
Dell Network Security  
@DanielAyoub

For educational purposes only. My views only, not of Dell. I did not create or contribute to the development of any of the hardware or software discussed.



# Agenda

1

RFID primer

2

RFID authentication systems


3

Promark3

- Read ID card
- Simulate ID card

4

Risk overview and conclusion




# The physics...

## Electromagnetic Induction

*The induced electromotive force in any closed circuit is equal to the negative of the time rate of change of the magnetic flux through the circuit.*

-Faraday's Law 1831



[http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/E/electromagnetic\\_induction.html](http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/E/electromagnetic_induction.html)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic\\_induction](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_induction)


# Faraday's Law

## Practical Application

*When a wire coil is exposed to magnetic field flowing in the direction 'B', an electric current is induced in the wire in direction 'i'.*

The opposite is also true...

*When an electric current in direction 'i' is sent through a wire coil, a magnetic field in the direction 'B' is generated.*




Copyright © Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.



<http://www.physics.sjsu.edu/becker/physics51/induction.htm>

# RFID: Radio Frequency Identification

- ◆ Developed in 1970s
- ◆ Consists of microchip and an antenna
- ◆ Current generated by the antenna powers the chip
- ◆ Data about the RFID tag can be stored on the chip
- ◆ Remote readers can access this data
- ◆ There are many form factors of RFID circuits






Antenna




Chip



<http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/hightechid/int-d3700/doc/6/>



# Reading RFID Tags



- ◆ Several standards for RFID tags
  - ◆ The modulation, protocols and microchip type are the main differences
- ◆ Different chips provide different levels of information storage and authentication
- ◆ Each reader and antenna are specially tuned for specific RFID tag types
- ◆ Software running on the computer is used to interpret the data and log the interaction
- ◆ Many modern cards rely on encrypted communications



<https://www.msasys.com/hardware/rfid-products/rfid-readers>  
<http://www.epc-rfid.info/rfid>


# RFID Applications




# RFID Access Control Systems



# Access Control System



[http://www.securespin.in/?page\\_id=169](http://www.securespin.in/?page_id=169)





**iCLASS® Seos™**  
State-of-the-art, SIO-enabled, high security smart card credentials for microprocessor cards and smartphones

**iCLASS SE®**  
High security, SIO-enabled smart card credentials for iCLASS as well as MIFARE technology and DESFire technology

**pivCLASS®**  
pivCLASS Premium Security Dual interface Smart Card for FIPS201 deployments

**iCLASS®**  
High frequency, secure contactless smart card credentials



**ActivID® Authentication**  
Enables organizations to securely issue and manage smart card credentials

**Crescendo®**  
High security hybrid smart card technology for converged physical and logical access control

**FlexSmart®/ MIFARE®/ DESFire®**  
High frequency, secure contactless smart card credentials

**HITAG**  
Low Frequency secure solution for contactless smart card credentials



**HID Prox®**  
Low frequency, entry-level proximity cards for physical access control

**Indala® Proximity**  
Low frequency entry-level proximity cards for physical access control

**UltraCard®**  
Non-technology ID cards

**LEGIC®**  
High Frequency, contactless smart card credentials




# RFID Tag Types

- There are numerous standards, this vendor (HID) offers more than 10 different types of RFID based access cards.
- Different cards tend to be used for different purposes depending upon the level of authentication needed.
- Some cards even support things like FIPS201 and 3DES or AES encrypted communication for secure authentication.



# Breaking RFID


- Security researchers have been investigating RFID authentication technology for a number of years (5+).
- There are several examples of 'broken' RFID standards which are widely used (Mifare, iClass, Hitag2).
- Many attacks based on flaws in proprietary encryption and hashing protocols implemented by manufacturers.




<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NW3RGbQTLhE>  
<http://www.proxmark.org/forum/index.php>  
[http://www.openpcd.org/OpenPCD\\_Passive\\_RFID\\_Project](http://www.openpcd.org/OpenPCD_Passive_RFID_Project)

# Proxmark3


- Developed in 2007 as a masters thesis project by Jonathan Westhues
- Designed to sniff, read, clone or emulate RFID cards; extensive support for numerous standards
- Device supported in Windows and Linux, originally command line interface however new point & click GUI recently released
- Uses FPGA to simulate card types



<http://www.proxmark.org/proxmark>



# Proxmark3 Hardware



JTAG


8-Bit Analog to  
Digital Converter

FPGA

Microcontroller

USB

Antenna



<https://code.google.com/p/proxmark3/wiki/HardwareDescription>

# Proxmark3 Firmware

## Bootrom

Supports reflashing  
over USB

Transfers execution  
to OS

Safety in case OS  
is corrupted

## FPGA

Intermediate  
processing of RF  
signals


Makes signals  
available for ARM

## Operating System

Communicates with  
client over USB

Implements most of  
the Proxmark's  
functionality

Most frequently  
updated



<https://code.google.com/p/proxmark3/wiki/Compiling>




# Proxmark3 Firmware Version

```
proxmark3> hw version
#db# Prox/RFID mark3 RFID instrument
#db# bootrom: svn 839 2013-12-05 07:11:23
#db# os: svn 839 2013-12-05 07:11:28
#db# FPGA image built on 2013/11/19 at 18:17:10
uC: AT91SAM7S256 Rev A
Embedded Processor: ARM7TDMI
Nonvolatile Program Memory Size: 256K bytes
Second Nonvolatile Program Memory Size: None
Internal SRAM Size: 256K bytes
Architecture Identifier: AT91SAM7Sxx Series
Nonvolatile Program Memory Type: Embedded Flash Memory
proxmark3>
```

Development is ongoing & has a very active community – the firmware version tested was less than 3 weeks old.



# Proxmark3 Drivers




/ir  
8

\*Windows 8 not officially supported



# Proxmark3 Antenna Types





```
proxmark3> hw tune
proxmark3>
proxmark3> #db# Measuring antenna characteristics, please wait...
proxmark3> #db# Measuring complete, sending report back to host
proxmark3>
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 13.83 V @ 125.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 13.56 V @ 134.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF optimal: 16.52 V @ 129.03 kHz
proxmark3> # HF antenna: 0.23 V @ 13.56 MHz
proxmark3> # Your HF antenna is unusable.
```



```
proxmark3> hw tune
proxmark3>
proxmark3> #db# Measuring antenna characteristics, please wait...
proxmark3> #db# Measuring complete, sending report back to host
proxmark3>
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 125.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 134.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF optimal: 0.00 V @ 12000.00 kHz
proxmark3> # HF antenna: 10.67 V @ 13.56 MHz
proxmark3> # Your LF antenna is unusable.
```




# Proxmark3 Client GUI



More than 15 different standards supported

Compatible with about 20 card types as of January 2014



# Card Identification

The screenshot shows the Proxmark Client interface. The left pane displays a tree view with 'Hardware' expanded to 'LCD'. The terminal window shows the following output:


```
proxmark3>
proxmark3> #db# Measuring antenna characteristics, please wait...
proxmark3> #db# Measuring complete, sending report back to host
proxmark3>
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 125.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 134.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF optimal: 0.00 V @ 12000.00 kHz
proxmark3> # HF antenna: 10.83 V @ 13.56 MHz
proxmark3> # Your LF antenna is unusable
proxmark3> hw tune
proxmark3>
proxmark3> #db# Measuring antenna characteristics, please wait...
proxmark3> #db# Measuring complete, sending report back to host
proxmark3>
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 125.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF antenna: 0.00 V @ 134.00 kHz
proxmark3> # LF optimal: 0.00 V @ 12000.00 kHz
proxmark3> # HF antenna: 6.77 V @ 13.56 MHz
proxmark3> # Your LF antenna is unusable.
```

The photograph shows the Proxmark3 hardware connected to a laptop. A name tag in front of the device reads: 'EXHIBITOR Daniel Ayoub Product Marketing Manager SoniWALL'.

Ready!

Voltage drop indicated this is a HF card.  
Next step it to try supported HF card 'reader' functions

Sometimes you know...




This manufacturer tell us exactly what kind of card it is. 😊




# Snooping

- ◆ Objective is to observe interaction with a reader in order to capture enough data to derive the keys needed to encrypt communication
- ◆ Proxmark3 can also try to simulate a valid card in order to generate additional traffic
- ◆ Requires an attacker to get physically close to an entrance with his laptop (or android phone) and proxmark3
- ◆ Not all card types supported.



# Simulating

- ◆ This is where the Proxmark3 shines.
- ◆ Not all card types can be simulated however many types can
- ◆ Functionality is very straight forward, can be used in situations where you do not even have the card
- ◆ Can also be used as part of a brute-force attack with a little scripting and imagination
- ◆ Proxmark3 supports some limited 'stand-alone' simulation modes that do not require a computer (can run on batteries)



# Cloning

- ◆ Often requires specialized reader/writer equipment.
- ◆ Equipment is relatively cheap and easy to come by; software can also be purchased online to enable cloning for some cards.
- ◆ Proxmark3 capable of doing some card cloning but not all card types are supported, some vendors include master keys within their readers.
- ◆ There are several other RFID hacking devices in addition to PM3 available on the internet; many specialize in cloning

## Products > Cloner



HID-cloner-portable  
AWID ID HID card  
cloner portable



super-mifare-cracker-  
card  
super mifare cracker  
card



Car Key cloner super  
AD900  
Car Key cloner super  
AD900



magnetic stripe card  
cloner  
magnetic stripe card  
cloner



EM4100-ID-card-cloner-  
portable  
EM4100 ID card cloner  
portable



iclass-card-clone  
software  
HID iClass card cloner  
software



indala-card-cloner-001  
indala card cloner




mifare-cloner  
mifare cloner



HID-card-cloner-  
desktop  
HID card cloner desktop



Hitag2-card-key-cloner  
Hitag2 card key cloner





# Further iClass Attacks

Dis

27TH CHAOS CO

Flavio D

H

Abstract of the mo used for a 64-bit key diversification them is p security n col and k Furtherm two attac (a.k.a., iC first attac and 2<sup>22</sup> c of 2<sup>40</sup> M a day on against iC key from computat tations, w

**Abstract**—T iCLASS™ read lems found w authentication iCLASS™ Stan The chosen authentication important hea mode in order iCLASS Stand This paper Security keys leaving visible

*Hunters , they all bearing t*  
— Joseph

Most exist and Legic Pr security foun other undocu

iClass is one of on the market. payment syste built-in key div engineered this the update card card. This also a proprietary k show that the resistant. Mor that outputs a ate pre-images master key is n single DES. C in all iClass re and gain acces

**1 Introdu**  
Over the last the (in)security

iCLASS Levels of

Tuesday, November 2

## Dumping iClass

By Brad Antoniewicz.

iCLASS is the

Do yo

The iC



iClass, arguably the se systems (the first being card type. It provides a stored on the card and card and the reader. A Milosch Meriac took a reader and released e

iClass Ca

## A Covert Approach to Recovering iClass High Security Keys

### Background

The HID iClass family of 1 the primary goal of elimin Proximity technology. The authentication and Triple duplication.

The contactless cards the company by the name of a small EEPROM memory reader using the ISO 1444

All data stored on iClass c protect data from being r keys (56 key bits plus 8 p Application Areas. Two e

Since its introduction, nu who have all described th words are usually interpre and to identify and exploi least two excellent paper papers discuss various me are used with HID's "Stan readers. The extraction o iClass cards that exist in t

"Heart of Darkness- explo <http://www.openpcd.org>

"Exposing iClass Key Dive <http://www.usenix.org/e>

### Introduction

There have been several papers published over the last two years that describe various techniques for exploiting the vulnerabilities that are present within the HID iClass family of contactless readers. The benefit of such papers has been widely debated within the security industry but it is the opinion of this author they do serve two main purposes. Since these systems are used worldwide to protect valuable physical and intellectual property assets, these papers not only allow end users to make informed decisions about the security of the hardware they use but they also force access system manufacturers to continually improve their products and make them less vulnerable to these types of attacks.

A sampling of these recent papers is included below:

Heart of Darkness - exploring the uncharted backwaters of HID iCLASS security. <http://www.openpcd.org/images/HID-iCLASS-security.pdf>

Dismantling iClass and iClass Elite [http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/dismantling\\_iClass.pdf](http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/dismantling_iClass.pdf)

Exposing iClass Key Diversification [http://www.static.usenix.org/events/woot11/tech/final\\_files/Garcia.pdf](http://www.static.usenix.org/events/woot11/tech/final_files/Garcia.pdf)

iClass Key Extraction – Exploiting the ICSP Interface [http://www.proxclone.com/pdfs/iClass\\_Key\\_Extraction.pdf](http://www.proxclone.com/pdfs/iClass_Key_Extraction.pdf)

This particular paper attempts to demonstrate how a combination of these previously exposed vulnerabilities and reverse engineered algorithms can be applied to create a real threat to existing high security systems. It will show that custom hardware can be easily built and used to "wirelessly" extract secret key information from any "Elite" or "High Security" iClass systems. This key information can then be used to create, copy, or modify any iClass credential regardless of whether it is distributed by HID or by one of HID's worldwide licensed partners.




DELL

<http://www.openpcd.org>  
[http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/dismantling\\_iClass.pdf](http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/dismantling_iClass.pdf)  
[https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/woot11/tech/final\\_files/Garcia.pdf](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/woot11/tech/final_files/Garcia.pdf)  
[http://proxclone.com/pdfs/iClass\\_Cloner\\_rev0.pdf](http://proxclone.com/pdfs/iClass_Cloner_rev0.pdf)  
<http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2012/11/dumping-iclass-keys.html>

#RSAC

RSACONFERENCE2014

# MIFARE Attacks



Detailed white papers are available to explain attack methodologies.



# Threat Assessment

- ◆ Proxmark3 is a development platform capable of running customizable software, a skilled programmer could develop support for almost any RFID card type
- ◆ The amount of research that has been done in this field is overwhelming, breaking modern RFID systems is not 'point and click' but it can be done
- ◆ Most card types have already been broken or can be if someone writes the code
- ◆ Motivated attacker could use the proxmark3 to do a lot of damage
- ◆ Overall threat should be considered 'medium-high'



감사합니다 Natick

Grazie Danke Ευχαριστίες Dalu

Thank You Köszönöm

Спасибо Dank Gracias

谢谢 Merci Seé  
ありがとう

Obrigado

